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Transparency of History in Galactic Game Theory

… and the Long First Turn.

If and when our civ reaches the stars, we will likely bump up against alien civs. How might galactic-scale incentives and interactions play out? How might cooperative civs react to humanity impulse to optimise near term survival and exclusive benefit – and willingness to throw values under the bus to gain and maintain competitive advantage?

This post has been influenced by Robin Hanson’s and Anders Sandberg’s thoughts on galactic game theory, Scott Alexander’s Meditations on Moloch and a number of interviews with Daniel Schmachtenberger.

Robin Hanson has touched on that idea that Earth’s light frequencies, radio/TV signals expand outward in an ever-growing sphere—across a handful of posts and as part of a broader discussions (the Great Filter, SETI, alien incentives, etc.). In my conversations with him online I remember he mentioned that advanced civs may find it really difficult to lie about their histories. I forget where at this point, but will update this post when I find the right references.

Assumptions in Brief

  1. Observability of Histories: Advanced civilizations can, in principle, reconstruct each other’s past behaviours via electromagnetic signals or other detectable traces, making it hard to lie about major historical facts.
  2. Universal Game: Over long timescales, civilizations become aware of each other, know about each other’s capabilities, moral track records, and they all know that everyone else knows this.
  3. Moral Realism (At Least in Core): There are universal moral facts or near-universal moral insights around suffering, well-being, and “fair” distribution of resources; advanced intelligences can discover or converge on them.
  4. No Extreme Offensive Advantage: There is no overwhelming “first-strike” capability that trivially allows a powerful aggressor to wipe out rivals without risk or cost.
  5. “Cooperator” vs “Defector”: A simplified label. Cooperators respect moral norms that reduce suffering, distribute benefits fairly, and coordinate to uphold just, stable frameworks; defectors exploit or harm others for narrower self-interest.

Would There Be Stronger Incentives to Cooperate Than to Defect?

Yes, likely.
Because histories are observable and verifiable, a civilisation that commits moral atrocities or routinely violates interstellar agreements cannot hide these facts—leading to reputational damage. If interactions are not one-shot but rather iterated (over millennia or longer), then defection carries long-term costs—others can collectively sanction or isolate a defector. Also, without a large asymmetry in power, a defector risks retaliation, forming a stable deterrence environment.
Cooperation promises vast gains in technology-sharing, resource exchange, mutual defence, and cultural/scientific growth. The synergy of multiple civilizations working together is presumably greater than going it alone—especially over cosmic timescales.

Together (visibility & accountability + iterated cosmic game theory + no overwhelming offensive edge + trade & knowledge benefits) these create a strong incentive to join a “cooperative club,” abide by some moral norms, and avoid being flagged as a pariah civilization.

Would Cooperators Converge on Optimising for Well-Being?

Likely some version of that—though “optimising for well-being” can mean different things across civilisations, each with unique cultural or biological backgrounds. But if moral realism is true in at least some core sense (minimizing suffering, maximising flourishing, fairness, etc.), then advanced cooperators: a) will share certain moral axioms: e.g., suffering is bad, well-being is good, wanton harm is unjustifiable, b) will coordinate to reduce destructive conflict: They see it as a moral negative and a practical risk, because conflict is costly and destructive for everyone, and c) will enact fair distribution of opportunities (optionality + resources), or at least attempt not to hoard at the expense of others.

Over cosmic timescales, different civilisations might have different conceptions of how to measure or weight well-being—but you’d expect a broad coalition among those who see the logic of mutual moral constraints and synergy.

Would the Cooperators in Aggregate Be Stronger Than Defectors?

Probably, yes.

In an iterated environment, cooperators can form coalitions, share resources, and present a united front against defectors. Because advanced civilizations that last for eons presumably want stability, they can coordinate to deter or penalize defectors. Defectors might find themselves isolated, lacking partners for trade or mutual defence—making them systematically weaker – more on penalization next.

In general, collective power arises from broad alliances: technology exchange, robust trade networks, shared defence pacts, etc. This is commonly seen in real-world human history, and it presumably generalizes if no single empire can roll over all others easily.

Would Cooperators Penalize Defectors?

Yes, in various ways. There is refusal to trade with and isolation from defectors, defensive alliances against defectors and reputational damages to defectors. Potential penalties might include: a) cutting off technological or economic exchange so the defector lags behind in future developments, b) formal or informal pacts that ensure any aggression by the defector meets widespread resistance, and c) reputational damage where the defector’s moral standing drops, making other civilizations wary or unwilling to form beneficial agreements with them.

    The method of penalizing could be direct or indirect—depending on how “aggressive” the cooperators are allowed to be without violating their own moral principles. They might prefer, where practical, “containment” strategies over outright extermination.

    Would Cooperators Penalize Non-Defector Civilisations With Immoral Histories?

    Possibly, yes, but it depends on how “immoral history” transitions into the present:

    If the immoral actions were truly in the past and the civilization were genuinely now stable and moral, cooperators might see punishing them as counterproductive. They could say: “We reward reformed behavior.” However if atrocities continue unabated: Cooperators could impose sanctions, isolate, or (in extreme cases) forcibly intervene. But the difficult one is future risk: If the immoral history suggests a continuing or repeated pattern, cooperators might see it as a direct threat to cosmic stability and act accordingly.

    A key dynamic is whether cooperators believe in moral improvement and rehabilitation or see a historically aggressive civilization as too risky to allow the chance to repeat such actions.

    Would Cooperators Trust Less Civilizations With “Immoral Histories”?

    Yes, but with nuance. Context Matters: A civilization may have had a violent or oppressive past but then reformed, especially once it recognized moral truths or changed leadership. Cooperators might look for proof of genuine reform, new governance structures, institutional checks to ensure atrocities aren’t repeated. Also cooperators might consider the nature and recency of offences – if the immoral acts were recent and the civilization shows no sign of regret or reparation, the trust penalty could be severe. If it’s ancient history, overshadowed by millennia of good conduct, the cooperator response might be more lenient.

    Because so much can be “seen” via signals, a civilization’s attempts to cover up wrongdoing or to rationalize it in obviously false ways might worsen distrust. A posture of honesty, restitution, and robust reforms might mitigate suspicion over time.

    Hence, the impetus for civilisations to keep their moral house in order, or at least be seen transparently addressing past injustices.

    But what if a civ had a long history of advanced moral knowledge?

    If a civ refuses to acknowledge wrongdoing or to assist victims or their descendants, or if the civ continues oppressive systems—e.g., enslaving large populations or violently suppressing dissent—then others conclude it’s not committed to stable moral norms. And even moreso, if the civ invests in offensive capabilities beyond what’s typical for defence and signals readiness to use them aggressively, it will be labelled a high-risk partner.

    In short, behaviours that conflict with the recognised moral baseline—and demonstrate no attempts at reform—would damage trust.

    Visibility & Reputational Long Memory Discouraging “Exploit-then-Reform” Strategies

    Since one of the core assumptions is that advanced civilizations can, in principle, reconstruct each other’s histories from electromagnetic or other signals, there will be little room to hide. Cooperative civs with long memories of atrocities may persist reputations. The knowledge that ones immoral actions will be discovered and will tarnish your reputation in perpetuity dramatically raises the cost of defection. You get short-term gains but suffer a lasting “defector” label that advanced cooperators will remember.

    Long timelines mean future payoffs dominate short-term gains; being ostracized (or attacked) for centuries or millennia is far more costly than the short-lived benefits of exploitation. Even if a defector tries to “flip” to moral cooperation, they face distrust and must prove genuine change for an extended period—undercutting the easy “exploit-then-reform” payoff.

    The Long First Turn: Exploit, Then Reform—Until We Meet the Big Coalition

    How might the “exploit, then reform” strategy might play out for a budding civilization that has not yet encountered any advanced cooperative coalitions, and how galactic game-theoretic dynamics could (or could not) discourage that behaviour? The core difficulty is that the first “turn” could be extremely long, giving a budding civ plenty of time for exploitation without immediate external oversight.

    Assume that the budding civilisation (Civ B) is advanced enough to grasp moral truths and foresee future cosmic encounters, but it hasn’t yet met a powerful moral coalition. It decides to “Exploit now”: Oppress, torture, hoard resources domestically, or do other immoral acts to maximise short-term gains, and then “Clean up later”: Once it detects or are contacted by a galactic moral coalition, it claims to have reformed, hoping to avoid punishments and gain cooperation benefits – a realpolitik of pivoting away and to moral compliance when it deemed in ones interest, hoping to sidestep or minimise punishment while still having profited from the prior exploitation. With such a Long First Turn, where contact might not happen for centuries, millennia, or longer, Civ B can “enjoy” the benefits of exploitation for a very long time.

    What to do about this?

    Game theoretically, the idea of some kind of post-hoc justice or reparations may disincent civ B doing exploitative. The combination of a durable stigma, iterated reputational effects, advanced detection, and credible sanctions may be enough to temper or prevent extended exploitation during a long first turn. Once the coalition arrives, they may require that Civ B compensate victims, provide restitution- it may refuse to share advanced knowledge or resources until those reparations are complete—delaying Civ B’s cosmic gain..

    I’ll have more on this in time.

    Big-Picture

    Given the assumptions above:

    • Trust is tied to moral track record, especially if they know the moral landscape and have for a while. Civilizations with immoral histories must demonstrate reform to gain acceptance. If they continue harming or exploiting, they risk permanent or long-term penalties.
    • Defectors would face penalties—ranging from isolation to joint resistance or sanctions—especially if they pose a clear threat to the cosmic order.
    • Strong incentives to cooperate under conditions of observable histories, moral convergence, and no overwhelming offensive advantage.
    • Yes, cooperators are likely to converge on some broadly “pro-well-being” stance—though the exact moral or political structure might differ.
    • Cooperators collectively outmatch defectors, because they pool resources and reduce the risk of catastrophic conflicts among themselves.

    Notes


    It seems Scott Alexander leans moral realist (but not 100%). He has speculated that if something like MR is true, this would have big implications for superintelligence – still trying to find a reference that exists outside my memory.

    In broad brush strokes Iain M. Banks’s Culture novels, the advanced and utopian Culture often intervenes in the affairs of other, less developed civilizations. These interventions can range from subtle manipulations to outright military action. The Culture often justifies these actions by claiming to be preventing suffering and promoting the development of other civilisations towards a more enlightened state, mirroring their own. However, these interventions are often not perfect, and the Culture’s actions are frequently questioned, raising ethical dilemmas about the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other societies and the potential for unintended consequences.

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