Amazing Progress in Artificial Intelligence – Ben Goertzel

At a recent conference in Beijing (the Global Innovators Conference) – I did yet another video interview with the legendary AGI guru – Ben Goertzel. This is the first part of the interview, where he talks about some of the ‘amazing’ progress in AI over recent years, including Deep Mind’s AlphaGo sealing a 4-1 victory over Go grandmaster Lee Sedol, progress in hybrid architectures in AI (Deep Learning, Reinforcement Learning, etc), interesting academic research in AI being taken up by tech giants, and finally providing some sobering remarks on the limitations of deep neural networks.

All Aboard The Ship of Theseus with Keith Wiley

An exploration of the philosophical concept of metaphysical identity, using numerous variations on the infamous Ship of Theseus thought experiment.

Video interview with Keith Wiley

Note: a separate text interview is below.



Keith Wiley is the author of A Taxonomy and Metaphysics of Mind-Uploading, available on Amazon.

The ship of Theseus, also known as Theseus’ paradox, is a thought experiment that raises the question of whether an object that has had all of its components replaced remains fundamentally the same object. The paradox is most notably recorded by Plutarch in Life of Theseus from the late first century. Plutarch asked whether a ship that had been restored by replacing every single wooden part remained the same ship.

The paradox had been discussed by other ancient philosophers such as Heraclitus and Plato prior to Plutarch’s writings, and more recently by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Several variants are known, including the grandfather’s axe, which has had both head and handle replaced.
See more at Wikipedia…

Text Interview

Note this is not a transcription of the video/audio interview.

The Ship of Theseus Metaphor

Adam Ford: Firstly, what is the story or metaphor of the Ship of Theseus intended to convey?

Keith Wiley: Around the first century AD, Plutarch wrote several biographies, including one of the king Theseus entitled Life of Theseus, in which he wrote the following passage:

The ship on which Theseus sailed with the youths and returned in safety, the thirty-oared galley, was preserved by the Athenians down to the time of Demetrius Phalereus. They took away the old timbers from time to time, and put new and sound ones in their places, so that the vessel became a standing illustration for the philosophers in the mooted question of growth, some declaring that it remained the same, others that it was not the same vessel.Plutarch

People sometimes erroneously believe that Plutarch presents the scenario (replacing a ship piecemeal style until all original material is absent) with a conclusion or judgment, i.e., that it makes some prescription of the “correct” way to interpret the scenario (as to, yes or no, is the ship’s identity preserved). However, as you see from the passage above, this is not the case. Plutarch left the question open. He mere poses the question and leaves it to the reader to ruminate on an actual answer.

The specific questions in that scenario are:

  • Does identity require maintaining the same material components? Aka, is identity tied and indicated by specific sets of atoms?
  • If not, then does preservation of identity require some sort of temporally overlapping sequence of closely connected parts?

The more general question being asked is: What is the nature of identity? What are its properties? What are its requirements (to claim preservation under various circumstances)? What traits specify identity and indicate the transformations under which identity may be preserved and under which it is necessarily lost?

Here is a video explainer by Keith Wiley (intended to inspire viewers to think about identity preservation)

Adam Ford: How does this story relate to mind uploading?

Keith Wiley: The identity of relatively static objects, and of objects not possessing minds or consciousness, is an introduction to the thornier question of metaphysical personal identity, i.e., the identity of persons. The goal in considering how various theories of identity describe what is happening in the Ship of Theseus is to prime our thinking about what happens to personal identity of people in analogous scenarios. For example, in a most straightforward manner, the Ship of Theseus asks us to consider how our identity would be affected if we replaced, piecemeal style, all the material in our own bodies. The funny thing is, this is already the case! It is colloquially estimated that our bodies turn over their material components approximately every seven years (whether this is precisely accurate is beside the point). The intent is not that a conclusion drawn from the Ship of Theseus definitively resolves the question concerning personal identity, because the former is a much simpler scenario. The critical distinction is that people are more obviously dynamic across time than static physical objects because our minds undergo constant psychological change. This raises the question of whether some sort of “temporal continuity” is at play in people that does not take effect in ships. There is also the question of whether consciousness somehow changes the discussion in radical ways. So the Ship of Theseus is not conclusive on personal identity. It is just a way to get us started in thinking about such issues.

Adam Ford: Fishing for clarification on how you use the term ‘identity’, Robin Hanson (scenario of uploads in the future in Age of Em) enquired about what kind of identity concept you are interested in. That is, what function do you intend this concept to serve?

Keith Wiley: Sure. First, and this might not be what Robin meant, there are different fundamental kinds of identity, two big ones being quantitative and numerical. Two things quantitatively identified possess the same properties, but are not necessarily “the same entity”. Two things numerically identical are somehow “the same thing”, which is problematic in its phrasing since they were admitted to be “two things” to begin with. The crucial distinction is in whether numerical identity makes any difference, or whether quantitative identity is all the fundamentally matters.

For me, I phrase the crucial question of personal identity relative to mind uploading in the following way: Do we grant equal primacy to claims to the original single identity to all minds (people) who psychologically descend from that common ancestral mind (person)? I always phrase it this way: granting primacy in claims to a historical identity. Do we tolerate the metaphysical interpretation that all descendant minds are equal in the primacy of their claim to the identity they perceive themselves to be? Alternatively, do we disregard such claims, dictating to others that they are not, in fact, who they believe themselves to be, and that they are not entitled to the rights of the people they claim to be? My concern is of:
bias (differing assignments of traits to various people),
prejudice (differing assignments of values, claims, or rights resulting from bias),
and discrimination (actions favoring and dismissing various people, resulting from prejudices).

Adam Ford: Is ‘identity’ the most appropriate word to be using here?

Keith Wiley: Well, identity certainly doesn’t seem to fully “work”. There’s always some boundary case or exception that undermines any identity theory we attempt to assign. My primary concern, such as it is on an entirely abstract philosophical musing (at this point in history when mind uploading isn’t remotely possible yet) is only secondarily the nature of identity. The primary concern, justified by those secondary aspects of identity, is whether we should regard uploads in some denigrated fashion. Should we dismiss their claims that they are the original person, that they should be perceived as the original person, that they should be treated and entitled and “enrighted” as the original person? I don’t just mean from a legal standpoint. We can pass all sorts of laws that force people to be respectful, but that’s an uninteresting question to me. I’m asking if it is fundamentally right or wrong to regard an upload in a denigrated way when judging its identity claims.

Ontology, Classification & Reality

Adam Ford: As we move forward the classification of identity will likely be fraught with struggle. We might need to invent new words to clarify the difference between distinct concepts. Do you have any ideas for new words?

Keith Wiley: The terminology I generally use is that of mind descendants and mind ancestors. In this way we can ask whether all minds descending from a common ancestral mind should be afforded equal primacy in their claim to the ancestral identity, or alternatively, whether there is a reasonable justification to exhibit biases, prejudices, and discriminations against some minds over such such questions. Personally, I don’t believe any such asymmetry in our judgment of persons and their identity claims can be grounded on physical or material traits (such as whose brain is composed of more matter from the ancestral brain, which comes up when debating nondestructive uploading scenarios).

Adam Ford: An appropriate definition for legal reasons?

Keith Wiley: I find legal distinctions to be uninteresting. It used to be illegal for whites and blacks to marry. Who cares what the law says from a moral, much less metaphysical, perspective. I’m interested in finding the most consistent, least arbitrary, and least paradoxical way to comprehend reality, including the aspect of reality that describes how minds relate to their mental ancestors.

Adam Ford: For scientific reasons?

Keith Wiley: I don’t believe this is a scientific question. How to procedurally accomplish uploading is a scientific question. Whether it can be done in a nondestructive way, leaving the original body and brain unharmed, is a scientific question. Whether multi-uploading (producing multiple uploads at once) is technically possible is a scientific question, say via an initial scan that can be multi-instantiated. I think those are crucial scientific endeavors that will be pursued in the future, and I participate in some of the discussions around that research. But at this point in history, when nothing like mind uploading is possible yet, I am pursuing other aspects, nonscientific aspects, namely the philosophical question of whether we have the correct metaphysical notion of identity in the first place, and whether we are applying identity theories in an irrational, or even discriminatory, fashion.

Implications for Brain Preservation

Adam Ford: Potential brain preservation (inc cryonics) customers may be interested in knowing the possible likely science of reanimation (which, it has been suggested, includes mind uploading) – and the type of preservation which will most likely achieve the best results. Even though we don’t have mind uploading yet – people are committing their brains to preservation strategies that are to some degree based on strategies for revival. Mummification? No – that probably won’t work. Immersion in saline based solution? Yeah for short periods of time. Plastination? Yes but only if it’s the connectome we are after… And then there is different methods of cryonic suspension that may be tailored to different intended outcomes – do you want to destructively scan the brain layer by layer and be uploaded in the future? Do you want to be able to fully revive the actual brain in the (potentially in a longer term future)?

Keith Wiley: People closer to the cryonics community than myself, such as some of my fellow BPF board members, claim that most current cryonics enthusiasts (and paying members or current subjects) are not of the mind uploading persuasion, preferring biological revival instead. Perhaps because they tend to be older (baby boomer generation) they have not bought into computerization of brains and minds. Their passion for cryonics is far more aligned with the prospect of future biological revival. I suspect there will be a shift toward those of a mind uploading persuasion as the newer generations, more comfortable with computers, enter the cryonics community.

As you described above, there are few categories of preservation and a few paths of potential revival. Preservation is primarily of two sorts: cryogenic and at least conceivably reversible, and room temperature and inconceivably reversible. The former is amenable to both biological revival and mind uploading. The latter is exclusively amenable to mind uploading. Why would one ever choose the latter option then? Simple: it might be the better method of preservation! It might preserve the connectome in greater detail for longer periods of time with lesser rates of decay — or it might simply be cheaper or otherwise easier to maintain over the long term. After all, cryonic storage requires cryonic facilities and constant nitrogen reintroduction as it boils off. Room temperature storage can be put on the shelf and forgotten about for millennia.

Adam Ford: What about for social (family) reasons?

Keith Wiley: This is closer to the area where I think and write, although not necessarily in a family-oriented way. But social in terms of whether our social contracts with one another should justify treating certain people in a discriminatory fashion and whether there is a rational basis for such prejudices. Not that any of this will be a real-world issue with which to tackle for quite some time. But perhaps some day…

Adam Ford: If the intended outcomes of BP are for subjective personal reasons?

Keith Wiley: I would admit that much of my personal interest here is to try to grind out the absolutely most logical way to comprehend minds and identity relative to brains, especially under the sorts of physical transformations that brains could hypothetically experience (Parfit’s hemispherical fission, teleportation, gradual nanobot replacement, freeze-slice-scan-and-emulate, etc.).


Adam Ford: In relation to appropriate definitions of ‘identity’ for scientific reasons – what are your thoughts on the whole map/territory ‘is science real’ debate? Where do you sit – scientific realism, anti-realism and structural realism (epistemic or ontic)? what’s your favorite?

Keith Wiley: I suppose I lean toward scientific realism (to my understanding: scientific claims and truths hold real truth value, not just current societal “perspective”, and further they can be applied to yet-to-be observed phenomena), although antirealism is a nifty idea (scientific truths are essentially those which we have yet to disprove, but expect to with some future overturning, or furthermore, unobserved phenomena are not reasonable subjects of scientific inquiry). The reason I don’t like the latter is it leads to antiintellectualism, which is a huge problem for our society. Rather than overturning or disregarding scientific theories, I prefer to interpret it as that we refine them, saying that new theories apply in corners where the old ones didn’t fit well (Newton’s laws are fine in many circumstances, but are best appended by quantum mechanics at the boundary’s of their applicability). Structural and ontic realism are currently vague to me. I’ve read about them but haven’t really grinded through their implications yet.

Adam Ford: If we are concerned about our future and the future of things we value we perhaps should ask a fundamental question: How do things actually persist? (Whether you’re a perdurantist or an endurantist – this is still a relevant question – see 5.2 ‘How Things Persist?’ in ‘Endurantism and Perdurantism’)

Keith Wiley: Perdurantism and Endurantism are not terms I have come across before. I do like the idea of conceptualizing objects as 4D temporal “worms”. I describe brains that way in my book for example. If this is the “right” way (or at least a good way) to conceive of the existence of physical objects, then it partially solves the persistence or preservation-of-identity problem: preservation of identity is the temporal stream of physical continuity. The problem is, I reject any physical requirement for explicitly *personal* identity of minds, because there appears to be no associated physical trait — plus that would leave open how to handle brain fission, ala Parfit, so worms just *can’*t solve the problem of personal identity, only of physical objects.

Adam Ford: Cybernetics – signal is more important than substrate – has cybernetics influenced your thinking? If so, how?

Keith Wiley: If by signal, you mean function, then I’ve always held that the functional traits of the brain are far more important (it not entirely more important) than mere material components.

Adam Ford: “signal is more important than substrate” – Yet the signal quality depends on the substrate – surely a ship’s substrate is not as tightly coupled to its function of moving across a body of water (wood, fiberglass, even steel will work) than a conscious human mind is to its biological brain. in terms of the granularity of replacement part – how much is needed?

Keith Wiley: Good question. I have no idea. I tend to presume the requisite level is action potential processing and generation, which is a pretty popular assumption I think. We should be open on this question at this time in history and current state of scientific knowledge.

Adam Ford: What level of functional representation is needed in order to be preserve ‘selfhood’?

Keith Wiley: Short answer: We don’t know yet. Long answer, it is widely presumed that the action-potential patterns of the connectome are where the crucial stuff is happening, but this is a supposition. We don’t know for sure.

Adam Ford: A Trolley Problem applied to Mind Uploaded Clones: As with the classic trolley problem, a trolley is hurtling down a track towards 5 people. As in the classic case, you can divert it onto a separate track by pulling a nearby leaver. However, suddenly 5 functionally equivalent carbon copies* of the original 5 people appear on the separate track. Would you pull the lever to save the originals but kill the copies? Or leave the originals to die, saving the copies? (*assume you just know the copies are functionally equivalent to the originals)

Keith Wiley: Much of my writing focuses on mind uploading and the related question of what minds are and what personal identity is. My primary claim is that uploads are wholly human in their psychological traits and human rights, and furthermore that they have equal primacy in their claim to the identity of the person who preceded an uploading procedure — even if the bio-original body and brain survive! The upload is still no less “the original person” than the person housed in the materially original body, precisely because bodies and material preservation are irrelevant to who we are, by my reckoning. If this is not the case, then how can we solve the fission paradox? Who gets to “be the original” if we split someone in two? The best solution is that only psychological traits matter and material traits are simply irrelevant.

So, for those reasons, I would rephrase your trolley scenario thusly: track one has five people, track two has five other people. Coincidentally, pairs of people from each track have very recently diverging memories, but the scenario is psychologically symmetrical between the two tracks even if there is some physical asymmetry in terms of how old the various material compositions (bodies) are. So we can disregard notions of asymmetry for the purpose of analyzing the moral or identity-preserving-killing implications of the trolley problem. It is simply “Five people on one track, five on another. Should you pull the lever, killing those on the diverted track to save those on the initial track?” That’s how I rephrase it.

Adam Ford: I wonder if the experiment would yield different results if there were 5 individuals on one track and 6 copies of 1 person on the other? (As some people suggest that copies are actually identical to the original – eg for voting purposes)

Keith Wiley: But they clearly aren’t identical in the scenario you described. The classic trolley problem has always implied that the subjects are reasonably alert and mentally dynamic (thinking). It isn’t carefully described so as to imply that the people involved are explicitly unconscious, to say nothing of the complexities involved in rendering them as physically static objects (preserved brains undergoing essentially no metabolic or signal-processing (action potentials) activity. The problem is never posed that way. Consequently, they are all awake and therefore divergent from one another, distinct individuals with all the rights of individual personhood. So it’s just five against six in your example. That’s all there is to it. People might suggest, as you said above, that copies are identical to each other (or to the original), but those people are just wrong.

So an interesting question then, is what if the various subjects involved actually are unconscious or even rigidly preserved? Can we say their psychological sequences have not diverged and that they therefore represent redundant physical instantiations of a given mind? I explore this exact question in my book by the way. I think a case could be made that until psychological divergence (until the brains are rolling forward through time, accumulating experiences and memories) we can say they are redundant in terms of identity and associated person-value. But to be clear, if the bio-original was statically preserved, then uploaded or duplicated, and then both people were put on the train tracks in their preserved state, physically identical, frozen with no ongoing psychological experience, then I would be clear to state that while it might not matter if we kill the upload, it *also* doesn’t matter if we choose the other way and kill the bio-original! That is the obvious implication of my reasoning here. And in your case above, if we have five distinct people on one track (let’s stay everyone involved is statically preserved) and six uploads of one of those people on the other track, then we could recast the problem as “five on one track and one on the other”. The funny thing is, if we save the six and revive them, then, after the fact, we have granted life to six distinct individuals, but we can only say that after we revive them, not at the time of the trolley experiment when they are statically preserved. So now we are speculating on the “tentative” split personhood of a set of identical but static minds based on a later time when they might be revived. Does that tentative individuality grant them individuality while they are still preserved? Does the mere potential to diverge and individualize grant them full-blown distinct identity before the divergence has occurred? I don’t know. Fascinating question. I guess the anti-abortion-choice and pro-abortion-choice debate has been trying to sort out the personhood of tentative, potential, or possible persons for a long time (and by extension, whether contraception is acceptable hits the same question). We don’t seem to have all agreed on a solution there yet, so we probably won’t agree in this case either.

Philosophy of identity

Adam Ford: Retention of structure across atomic change – is identity the structure, the atomic composition, the atomic or structural continuum through change, or a mixture?

Keith Wiley: Depends on one’s chosen theory of identity of course. Body theory, psychological theory, psychological branching theory, closest continuer theory, 4D spacetime “worm” theory. There’s several to choose from — but I find that some more paradox-prone than others, and I generally take that as an indication of a weak theory. I’m a branchest, although the distinction from worm theory is, on some accounts, virtually indistinguishable.

Adam Ford: Leibniz thought about the Identity of indiscernibles (principle in ontology that no two things can have all properties the same) – if objX and objY share all the same properties, are they the same thing? If KeithX and KeithY share the same functional characteristics are they the same person?

Keith Wiley: But do they really share the same properties to begin with, or is the premise unfounded? When people casually analyze these sorts of scenarios, the two people are standing there, conscious, wondering if someone is about to pass judgment on them and kill them. They are experiencing the world from slightly different sensorial vantage points (vision, sound, etc.) Their minds are almost certainly diverged in their psychological state mere fractions of a second upon regaining consciousness. So they aren’t functionally identical in the first place. Thus the question is flawed, right? The question can only be applied if they are unconscious and rigidly preserved (frozen perhaps). Although I believe a case could be made that mere lack of consciousness is sufficient to designate them *psychologically* identical even if they are not necessarily physically identical due to microscopic metabolic variations — but I leave that subtly as an open question for the time being.

Adam Ford: Here is a Symmetric Universe counterexample – Max Black – two distinct perfect spheres (or two Ship of Theseuses) are two separate objects even though they share all the same properties – but don’t share the same space-time. What are your thoughts?

Keith Wiley: This is very close to worm theory. It distinguishes seemingly identical entities by considering their spacetime worms, which squiggle their way through different spacetime paths and are therefore not identical in the first place. They never were. The reason they appeared to be identical is that we only considered 3D space projection of their truly 4D spacetime structure. You can easily alias pairs of distinct higher-dimensional entities by looking only at their projections onto lower dimensions and thereby wrongly conclude that they are identical when, in fact, they never were to begin with in their true higher dimensional structure. For example, consider two volumes, a sphere and a cylinder. They are 3D. But project them onto a 2D plane (at the right angle) and you get two circles. You might wrongly conclude they are identical, but they weren’t to begin with! You simply ignored an entire dimension of their nature. That’s what the 4D spacetime worm says about the identity of physical objects.

However, once we dismiss any relevance or importance of physical traits anyway (because I reject body identity on the matter of personal identity, favoring psychological identity), then the 4D worm becomes more convoluted. The question then becomes, what sort of “time worm” describes psychological changes over time instead of physical, structure, and material changes over time? I think it’s as simple as: take an information pattern instantiated in a physical system (a brain), produce a second physical instantiation, and now readily conclude that the psychological temporal worm (just a temporal sequence of psychological states frankly) has diverged.

Adam Ford: Nice answer! – I’m certainly interested in hearing more about worm theory – I think this wikipedia source is about the same thing:
Do you have any personal writings I can point at in the text form of the interview?

Keith Wiley: Ah, I hadn’t heard that term before. Thanks for the reference. Well, I always refer to my book of course, and more recently Randal Koene and I published a paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies this past March.

(See Free near-final version on arxiv

Adam Ford: David Pearce is skeptical that our we as in our subjects of experience are actually enduring metaphysical egos – he seems more of a stage theorist – that each moment of subjective experience is fleeting – only persisting through one cycle of quantum cohesion delimited by decoherence.

Keith Wiley: Hmmm, I see the distinction in the link to stage theorist you provided above, and I do not believe I am committed to a position on that question. I go both ways in my own writing, sometimes describing things as true 4D entities (I describe brains that way in my book) but also writing quite frequently in terms of “mind descendants of mind ancestors”. That phrasing admits that perhaps identity does not span time in a temporal worm, but rather that it consists of instantaneous time slices of momentary identity connected in a temporal sequence. Like I said, I am uncommitted on this distinction, at least for now.

Identity: Accidental properties vs Essential properties

Adam Ford: Is the sense of an enduring metaphysical ego really an ‘accidental property’ (based on our intuitions of self) rather than an ‘essential property’ of identity?

Keith Wiley: It is possible we don’t yet know what a mind is in sufficient detail to answer such a question. I confess to not being entirely sure what the question is asking. That said, it is possible that conscious and cognitively rich aliens have come up with a fairly different way of comprehending what their minds actually are, and consequently may also have rather bizarre notions of what personal identity is.

Note that in the video, I sometimes offer an answer to the question “Did we preserve the ship in this scenario?” and I sometimes don’t, simply asking the viewer “So did we preserve it or not? What do you think?” This is because I’m certainly not sure of all the answers to this question in all the myriad scenarios yet.

Adam Ford: This argument is criticized by some modern philosophers on the grounds that it allegedly derives a conclusion about what is true from a premise about what people know. What people know or believe about an entity, they argue, is not really a characteristic of that entity.
There may be a problem in that what is true about a phenomenon or object (like identity) shouldn’t be derived from how we label or what we know about it – the label or description isn’t a characteristic of the identity (map not the territory etc).

Keith Wiley: I would essentially agree that identity shouldn’t merely be a convention of how we arbitrarily label things (i.e., that labeling grants or determines identity), but rather the reverse, that we are likely to label things so as to indicate how we perceive their identity. The question is, does our perception of identity indicate truth, which we then label, or does our perception determine or choose identity, which we then label? I would like to think reality is more objective than that, that there at least some aspects of identity that aren’t merely our choices, but rather traits of the world that we discover, observe, and finally label.




A Taxonomy and Metaphysics of Mind-Uploading
The Fallacy of Favouring Gradual Replacement Mind Uploading Over Scan-and-Copy Research Gate:

The Endurance/Perdurance Distinction By Neil Mckinnon
Endurantism and Perdurantism for a discussion on 3 different ways on what these terms have been taken to mean :


Perdure – remain in existence throughout a substantial period of time; persisting in virtue of having both temporal and spatial parts (alternatively the thesis that objects are four dimensional and have temporal parts)
Endure – being wholly present at all times at which it exists (endurance distinct from perducance in that endurance has strict identity and perdurance has a looser unity relation (genidentity))
Genidentity – is an existential relationship underlying the genesis of an object from one moment to the next.
Gunk – In mereology, an area of philosophical logic, the term gunk applies to any whole whose parts all have further proper parts. That is, a gunky object is not made of indivisible atoms or simples. Because parthood is transitive, any part of gunk is itself gunk.


Keith Wiley has a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of New Mexico and was one of the original members of MURG, the Mind Uploading Research Group, an online community dating to the mid-90s that discussed issues of consciousness with an aim toward mind-uploading. He has written multiple book chapters, peer-reviewed journal articles, and magazine articles, in addition to several essays on a broad array of topics, available on his website. Keith is also an avid rock-climber and a prolific classical piano composer.

Also see Jennifer Wang’s (Stanford University) video as she introduces us to the Ship of Theseus puzzle that has bedeviled philosophy since the ancient Greeks. She tells the Ship of Theseus story, and draws out the more general question behind it: what does it take for an object to persist over time? She then breaks this ancient problem down with modern clarity and rigor.

Longevity Day with Aubrey de Grey!

“Longevity Day” (based on the UN International Day of Older Persons – October 1) is a day of support for biomedical aging and longevity research. This has been a worldwide international campaign successfully adopted by many longevity activists groups. In this interview Aubrey de Grey lends support to Longevity Day and covers a variety of points, including:
– Updates: on progress at SENS (achievements, and predictions based on current support), funding campaigns, the recent Rejuvenation Biotechnology conference, and exciting news in health and medicine as it applies to longevity
– Advocacy: What advocates for longevity research need to know
– Effective Altruism and Science Philanthropy – giving with impact – cause prioritization and uncertainty – how to go about measuring estimates on impacts of dollars or units of effort given to research organizations
– Action: High impact areas, including more obvious steps to take, and some perhaps less obvious/underpopulated areas
– Leveraging Longevity Day: What to do in preparation to leverage Longevity Day? Once one has celebrated Longevity Day, what to do next?

“Longevity Day” (based on the UN International Day of Older Persons – October 1st) is a day of support for biomedical aging and longevity research. This has been a worldwide international campaign successfully adopted by many longevity activists groups.

Here is the Longevity Day Facebook Page.


Singularity Skepticism or Advocacy – to what extent is it warranted?

Why are some people so skeptical of the possibility of Super-intelligent Machines, while others take it quite seriously?
Hugo de Garis addresses both ‘Singularity Skepticism’ and advocacy – reasons for believing machine intelligence is not only possible but quite probable!
The Singularity will likely be an unprecedentedly huge issue that we will need to face in the coming decades.

Singularity Skepticism - Hugh de Garis. 2jpg

If you take the average person in the street and you talk to them about a future intelligent machine – there is a lot of skepticism – because today’s machines aren’t intelligent right? I know from my own personal experience that I get incredibly frustrated with computers, they crash all the time, they don’t do what I want… literally I say “I hate computers” but I really love them – so I have an ambivalent relationship with computers..Hugo de Garis

The exponential growth of technology and resolution of brain-scanning may lead to advanced neuro-engineering. Brain simulation right down to the chemical synapse, or just plain old functional brain representation might be possible within our lifetimes – this would likely lead to a neuromorphic flavour of the singularity.

There have been some enthusiastic and skeptical responses to this video so far on YouTube:

AZR NSMX1 commented that “Computers already have a better memory and a higher speed than human brain, they can learn and recognice the human voice since 1982 with the first software made for Kurzweil Industries, the expert systems are the first steps for thinking, then in 90’s we learned that emotions are more easy for machines than we believed, an emotion is just an uncontrolled reaction an automatic preservation code that may be good or not for a robot to reach its goal. Now in 2010 the Watson supercomputer show us that is able to structure the human language to produce a logic response, if that is not what does the thought, then somebody explain me what means to think. The only thing they still can’t do is the creative thinking and conciousness, but that will be reached between 2030 and 2035. Conciousness is just the amout and quality of the information you can process, IBM Blue Brain team said this, for example we the humans are very stupid when it comes to use and exploit all the possibilities offered by the smell sense compared to dogs or bears, in this dimension a cockroach is smarter than us because they can map the direction of smell to find the food or other members of their group, we can’t do this, we just have no consciusness in that world. Creativity is the most complex thing, if machines reaches creativity then our world will change because we will not only have to work anymore, but what is better we will not have to think anymore haha. Machines gonna do everything.”
 My response: There has certainly been some impressive strides in technological advancement, it might asymptote at some stage – not sure when, but my take is that there won’t likely be many fundamental engineering or scientific bottlenecks that will block or stifle progress – the biggest problems I think will be sociological impediments – human caused. 

Darian Rachel says “Around the 8 minute or so point he makes a statement that a machine will be built that is intelligent and conscious. He seems to pull this idea that it will be conscious “out of the air” somewhere. It seems to be a rather silly idea.”
 My response: while I agree that a conscious machine is likely difficult to build, there doesn’t seem to be much agreement among humans about whether it exists, what consciousness actually is, whether it is a byproduct of (complex?) information processing and whether it is actually computable (using classical computation). Perhaps Hugo de Garis views consciousness as just being self-aware. 

Exile438 responded that the “human brain has 100billion neurons and each connects to 10,000 other neurons, 10^11*10^4=10^15 human brain capacity estimate. Brain scanning resolution and speed of computers doubles every so often so within the next 2 to 3 decades we can simulate a brain on a computer. If we can do that it would run electronically 4million times faster then our chemical brains. This leads to singularity.”
 My response: it’s certainly a strange and exciting time to be alive – the fundamental questions that we have been wrestling with since before recorded history – questions around personal identity and what makes us what we – may be unraveled within the lifetimes of most of us here today. 

Grand Unifying Theories in Physics with Sundance

Sundance describes particle physics and covers two grand unifying theories: super string theory and quantum loop gravity, then discusses the distribution of beliefs among experts on grand unifying theories and concludes by emphasisng the need for a wider research program in physics (and science in general) – as well as the funding to back it up.

Interview Video link:

Sundance at Ceres (2 of 16) headshotSundance Osland Bilson-Thompson is an Australian theoretical particle physicist. He has developed the idea that certain preon models may be represented topologically, rather than by treating preons as pointlike particles. His ideas have attracted interest in the field of loop quantum gravity, as they may represent a way of incorporating the Standard Model into loop quantum gravity. This would make loop quantum gravity a candidate theory of everything. At the time he was a Visiting Academic at the University of Adelaide. From 2006 to 2009 he was a full-time academic at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. From 2010 he held a Ramsay Postdoctoral Fellowship at the University of Adelaide, Australia.

Photos taken at Interview

Cyclists Party

Sundance is currently running for the Cyclists Party in South Australia.

BloSundance at Ceres (2 of 16) smlg:

Brian Greene on Artificial Intelligence, the Importance of Fundamental Physics, Alien Life, and the Possible Future of Our Civilization

March 14th was Albert Einstein’s birthday, and also PI day, so it was a fitting day to be interviewing well known theoretical physicist and string theorist Brian Greene – the author of a number of books including, The Elegant Universe, Icarus at the Edge of Time, The Fabric of the Cosmos, and The Hidden Reality!
Think-Inc-logo2Many thanks to Suzi and Desh at THINKINC for helping organize this interview & for bringing Brian Greene to Australia for a number of shows (March 16 in Perth, March 18 in Sydney and March 19 in Melbourne) – check out for more info!

Audio recording of the interview:

About the Interview with Brian Greene

Brian Greene discusses implications Artificial Intelligence and news of DeepMind AI (AlphaGo) beating the world grand champion in the board game Go.  He then discusses physics string theory, the territory of opinion on grand unifying theories of physics, the importance of supporting fundamental science, the possibility of alien life, the possible future of our space-faring civilization and of course gravitational waves!

In answer to the question on the importance of supporting fundamental research in science, Brain Greene said:

I tell them to wake up! Wake up and recognize that fundamental science has radically changed the way they live their lives today. If any of these individuals have a cell phone, or a personal computer, or perhaps they themselves or loved ones has been saved by an MRI machine.. I mean any of these devices rely on integrated circuits, which they themselves rely on quantum physics – so IF those folks who were in charge in the 1920s had have said, ‘hey you guys working on quantum physics, that doesn’t seem to be relevant to anything in the world around as so were going to cut your funding – well those people would have short circuited on of the greatest revolutions that our species has gone through – the information age, the technological age – so the bottom line is we need to support fundamental research because we know historically that when you gain a deep understanding of how things work – we can often leverage that to then manipulate the world around us in spectacular ways! And that needs to be where our fundamental focus remains – in science!


Layered art of Brian Greene, background and series titleBrian Randolph Greene is an American theoretical physicist and string theorist. He has been a professor at Columbia University since 1996 and chairman of the World Science Festival since co-founding it in 2008. Greene has worked on mirror symmetry, relating two different Calabi–Yau manifolds (concretely, relating the conifold to one of its orbifolds). He also described the flop transition, a mild form of topology change, showing that topology in string theory can change at the conifold point.

Greene has become known to a wider audience through his books for the general public, The Elegant Universe, Icarus at the Edge of Time, The Fabric of the Cosmos, The Hidden Reality, and related PBS television specials. He also appeared on The Big Bang Theory episode “The Herb Garden Germination“, as well as the films Frequency and The Last Mimzy. He is currently a member of the Board of Sponsors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.


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Media series with James Hughes

James-Hughes---raysJames Hughes the Executive Director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, is a bioethicist and sociologist at Trinity College in Hartford Connecticut where he teaches health policy and serves as Director of Institutional Research and Planning. Dr. Hughes is a Fellow of the World Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a member of Humanity+, the Neuroethics Society, the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities and the Working Group on Ethics and Technology at Yale University. He serves on the State of Connecticut Regenerative Medicine Research Advisory Committee (formerly known as the Stem Cell Research Advisory Board).

A YouTube playlist of interviews and presentations:

Michio Kaku – A History of a Time to Come

Science, Technology & the Future interviews Dr. Michio Kaku on Artificial Intelligence and the Singularity, Biotech and Nanotechnology

  • What is it that is driving this revolution?
  • How do you think your background in Theoretical Physics shape your view on the future of the mind?
  • Intelligence enhancement, Internet of the mind – brain-net, like a hive mind? Where are we at with AI?
  • Many AI experts and scientists agree that some time in the future a Singularity will be possible (often disagreeing about when). What are your thoughts on the Singularity?
  • What about advances in Nanotechnology?
  • Is the Sticky Fingers problem a show stopper?

Michio is the author of many best sellers, most recently “the Future of the Mind” – We are entering a golden age of neuroscience – today it seems much of the discourse today seems to be it’s use in helping understand and treat mental illness (which is great) – though in the future, there will be other profound implications to understanding neuroscience – such as understanding the mechanics of intelligence…


Michio Kaku’s Biography

Michio Kaku (born January 24, 1947) is an American theoretical physicist, the Henry Semat Professor of Theoretical Physics at the City College of New York, a futurist, and a communicator and popularizer of science. He has written several books about physics and related topics, has made frequent appearances on radio, television, and film, and writes extensive online blogs and articles. He has written three New York Times Best Sellers: Physics of the Impossible (2008), Physics of the Future (2011), and The Future of the Mind (2014).

Kaku is the author of various popular science books:
– Beyond Einstein: The Cosmic Quest for the Theory of the Universe (with Jennifer Thompson) (1987)
– Hyperspace: A Scientific Odyssey through Parallel Universes, Time Warps, and the Tenth Dimension (1994)
– Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century[12] (1998)
– Einstein’s Cosmos: How Albert Einstein’s Vision Transformed Our Understanding of Space and Time (2004)
– Parallel Worlds: A Journey through Creation, Higher Dimensions, and the Future of the Cosmos (2004)
– Physics of the Impossible: A Scientific Exploration into the World of Phasers, Force Fields, Teleportation, and Time Travel (2008)
– Physics of the Future: How Science Will Shape Human Destiny and Our Daily Lives by the Year 2100 (2011)
– The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest to Understand, Enhance, and Empower the Mind (2014)

Also see this previous interview with Michio Kaku:


The Future of the Mind‘ – Book on Amazon.

Many thanks to Think Inc. who brought Dr Kaku to Australia!

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Science, Technology & the Future

Michio Kaku – The Future of the Mind – Intelligence Enhancement & the Singularity

Scifuture interview with popular scientist Michio Kaku on the Scientific Quest to Understand, Enhance & Empower the Mind!

The audio of this interview is found here.

Dr. Michio Kaku advocates thinking about some of the radical Transhumanist ideas we all know and love – here he speaks on the frontiers of Neuroscience, Intelligence Enhancement, the Singularity, and his new book ‘The Future of the Mind’!

String theory stems from Albert Einstein’s legacy; it combines the theory of general relativity and quantum mechanics by assuming the multiverse of universes. String field theory then uses the mathematics of fields to put it all into perspectives. Dr Kaku’s goal is to unite the four fundamental forces of nature into one ‘unified field theory’, a theory that seeks to summarise all fundamental laws of the universe in one simple equation.

Note Scifuture did another interview with Michio Kaku – the article can be found here, audio can be found here, and the video can be found here.


The Future of the Mind‘ – Book on Amazon.

Many thanks to Think Inc. who brought Dr Kaku to Australia!

Subscribe to the Science, Technology & the Future YouTube Channel


Science, Technology & the Future

Jamais Cascio – The Future and You! Security, Privacy, AI, Geoengineering

Jamais Cascio discusses the Participatory Panopticon, Privacy & Secrecy, the ramifications of Disconnecting from the Chorus, what it means to be a Futurist, the Arc of Human Evolution, Artificial Intelligence, the Need for Meaning, Building Agents to Listen to Us, /, Geoengineering and the Viridian Green movement.

We pollute our data-streams, to control we have over our identifying information. The motivation behind social networks is not to keep your information private.

Jamais Cascio - Privacy, Security the Future and YouInterview was conducted at the Humanity+ conference in San Francisco late 2012.
Jamais Cascio is a San Francisco Bay Area-based writer and ethical futurist specializing in design strategies and possible outcomes for future scenarios.
Jamais Cascio resides in the San Francisco Bay Area Cascio received his undergraduate degree from UC Santa Cruz and later attended UC Berkeley. In the 1990s, Cascio worked for the futurist and scenario planning firm Global Business Network. In 2007 he was a lead author on the Metaverse Roadmap Overview.


From 2003 to 2006 Cascio helped in the formation of Worldchanging. His activities covered topics related energy and climate change to global development, open source, and bio and nanotechnologies.
On November 29, 2010, Worldchanging announced that due to fundraising difficulties it would shut down. It has since merged with Architecture for Humanity, though detailed plans for the site’s future have not been released.

Open the Future

In early 2006, Cascio established Open The Future as his online home, a title based on his WorldChanging essay, The Open Future.

cascio_jamais_headshot-smSelected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the Top 100 Global Thinkers of 2009, Cascio writes about the intersection of emerging technologies, environmental dilemmas, and cultural transformation, specializing in the design and creation of plausible scenarios of the future. His work focuses on the importance of long-term, systemic thinking, emphasizing the power of openness, transparency and flexibility as catalysts for building a more resilient society.

Cascio’s work appears in publications as diverse as Metropolis, the Atlantic Monthly, The Wall Street Journal, and Foreign Policy. He has been featured in multiple documentaries discussing social and environmental futures, including National Geographic Television’s SIX DEGREES, its 2008 program on the effects of global warming, the 2010 Canadian Broadcasting Company feature, SURVIVING THE FUTURE, and the 2013 independent film FIXED: THE SCIENCE/FICTION OF HUMAN AUGMENTATION. He has also been featured in several science-oriented television documentary series.

Cascio currently serves as Director of Impacts Analysis for the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology. He is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Cascio was a speaker on the “On The Edge of Independent User-Creation In Gamespace” panel at the 2007 SXSW Interactive Festival. He is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Future where together with Jane McGonigal in 2008 he helped create and administer the large scale collaborative multiplayer game Superstruct as an advanced strategy to engage lots of other hopeful thinkers in the pursuit of possible strategies and positive outcomes of a proposed future scenario occurring in 2019.
In 2006, Cascio presented a TED Talk at the TED conference “The Future We Will Create,” in Monterey, California. In the presentation he outlined possible available solutions for the emerging world climate and energy crisis.